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Connection
JUSTICE
Revealing the Truth:
How Project Ploughshares Builds Peace
14
PRESBYTERIAN
SUMMER 2021
presbyterian.ca
 By Kelsey Gallagher,
researcher for Project Ploughshares
In September 2020, Project Plough- shares, which has tracked Canadian arms exports for more than four dec- ades, published a major report, Killer Optics: Exports of WESCAM Sensors to Turkey. It documented Turkey’s widespread use in several conflicts of Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs, also known as drones) that operate with key Canadian-made technology. In many cases, such use violates Canada’s arms control regime and international law, putting the onus on Canada to stop exports.
Soon after the report was re- leased, Turkey became involved in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. The government of Canada then suspended arms exports to Turkey. Without question, that act has cost tens of millions of dollars.
With an official government inves- tigation ongoing, it is uncertain what the final decision on exporting arms to Turkey will be. But we might be justified in thinking that the publica- tion of Killer Optics had a role in the initial stoppage and might encourage the Canadian government to continue to block arms sales to Turkey in the future.
Growing Arms
Exports to Turkey
For decades, Canada has exported large volumes of weapons to such major customers as the United States, the United Kingdom and Sau- di Arabia. But not to Turkey. In 2016, Turkey imported only $4.2 million in Canadian arms.
Then, in 2017, Canadian arms ex- ports to Turkey increased to $49.9 million. In 2018, exports jumped again—to $117.9 million. For 2019, the last year for which we have full governmental data, exports to Turkey were valued at $151.4 million.
What happened? There were no big announcements from Canadian arms manufacturers and no media repor ts on the ballooning arms exports.
Project Ploughshares did some digging. Our investigation revealed that, since 2017, Turkey has bought more than $200,000,000-worth of electro-optical/infra-red (EO/IR) combat sensors from L3Harris WES- CAM in Burlington, Ont. These imag- ing sensors, which identify, track and sometimes fire on ground targets, are employed in Turkey’s growing fleet of UAVs, particularly the Turkish-
made Bayraktar TB2. In some cases, Turkey has also illicitly “diverted” drones equipped with these sen- sors—to Libya, for example, where it has illegally supplied allied factions, in clear violation of Canadian and in- ternational export regulations and the UN arms embargo on Libya.
In recent years, the Turkish military has launched airstrikes in Iraq, Syria, Libya and within Turkey itself. There have been allegations that, in so do- ing, Turkey has breached internation- al humanitarian law (IHL), by failing to adequately provide for the safety of civilians.
Thus, when Turkey illegally invad- ed northern Syria in October 2019, Canada and many allies froze weap- ons exports to Turkey. The idea was to stop the provision of arms that might threaten the safety of civilians in the affected region.
We learned, however, that the “freeze” was not as complete as it seemed. According to Statistics Canada, large volumes of imaging equipment—in other words, WES- CAM sensors—quietly continued to be exported to Turkey.
Killer Optics and Nagorno-Karabakh
The release of Killer Optics gener- ated strong media interest. However, at first, the government of Canada displayed no interest or apparent awareness of the report’s allega- tions that exporting arms to Turkey breached Canada’s obligations as a State Party to the international Arms Trade Treaty, including for such rea- sons that they might have been used in IHL violations.
In the days following the report’s publication, conflict broke out once again between Armenia and Azerbai- jan in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Turkey, a long-time supporter of Azerbaijan, immediately became involved, providing military aid, in- cluding weapons. As the media soon revealed, Turkey was supplying Azerbaijan with Bayraktar TB2 UAVs, which Killer Optics had demonstrat- ed were invariably equipped with WESCAM sensors. In other words, Canadian-made hardware was di- recting Azeri airstrikes.
The global media response was im- mediate, and the Project Ploughshares report was frequently cited. This time, the government was forced to publicly address the allegations. Prime Minister Trudeau announced that then Foreign Minister François-Philippe Champagne
An Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle used by Turkey in conflicts. PHOTO CREDIT: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
had launched an investigation. Three days later, Champagne told members of the media that he had “suspended the relevant export permits to Turkey.”
But, of course, Canadian weapons had already been deployed—illegal- ly—to the conflict area. When Azer- baijan achieved a quick and com- plete victory, pundits gave much of the credit to Azerbaijan’s possession of Turkish UAVs, which would have been blind without Canadian target- ing technology.
The Current Situation
Last fall, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development began an investigation into the export of WES- CAM sensors to Turkey and their use in conflict. Staff from Project Plough- shares, Amnesty International Cana- da and the Rideau Institute testified before the committee. That investiga- tion was still ongoing at the time of this writing.
In March, through the committee, the government released more than 400 pages of heavily redacted docu- ments; a further 3,000 pages could be released at a later date. Even cen- sured, they represent a treasure trove for the Canadian peace movement, which has never before had such a window into the inner workings of Canada’s arms control regime.
But it still seems like too little, too late. These Canadian-made weap- ons have already spread throughout the region, contributing to violence in some of today’s most heinous conflicts.
If the government of Canada wants to contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflict abroad, it must develop the political will to deny problematic arms exports from the outset. In this case, the recipient was Turkey. In other cas- es, it is Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates or Israel. Canada’s legal obligations not to arm those who are likely to breach human rights or mis- use weapons are unambiguous.
And Project Ploughshares also learned from this experience. That even in these days of misinformation and social-media din, the truth can come out—and make a difference. Civil society doesn’t craft policy. That is the role of our government. But we can encourage elected officials to learn the truth and to act on it. In this way, we contribute to the foundations of lasting peace.
Killer Optics can be found at ploughshares.ca. The spring issue of the quarterly publication The Plough- shares Monitor is now available. Pro- ject Ploughshares accepts donations online. Thank you for your support.
   Project Ploughshares is the peace research institute of the Canadian Council of Churches. The Presbyterian Church in Canada is a partner of Project Ploughshares and is represented on its management committee by the Rev. Matthew Lingard.




























































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